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The Problem of Settlement Class Actions
Howard M. Erichson*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that class actions should never be certified solely for
purposes of settlement. Contrary to the widespread “settlement class action”
practice that has emerged in recent decades, contrary to current case law permitting settlement class certification, and contrary to recent proposals that
would extend and facilitate settlement class actions, this Article contends that
settlement class actions are ill-advised as a matter of litigation policy and illegitimate as a matter of judicial authority. This is not to say that disputes
should not be resolved on a classwide basis, or that class actions should not be
resolved by negotiated resolutions. Rather, this Article contends that if a dispute is to be resolved on a classwide basis, then the resolution should occur
after a court has found the matter suitable for classwide adjudication, regardless of settlement.
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INTRODUCTION
In modern class action practice, most class actions are certified
not for litigation, but for settlement.1 Known as “settlement class actions,” such proceedings provide a mechanism for defendants to resolve mass liability exposure without the risk of a class trial. In a
settlement class action, prior to class certification, the defendant negotiates an agreement with would-be class counsel. If they reach agreement on terms to resolve claims on a classwide basis, then they move
jointly for class certification and approval of the settlement.2
This Article inquires into the legitimacy of settlement class actions. It asks whether a class settlement ought ever to be approved if
the class has not been certified for litigation, and concludes—contrary
to the widespread practice that has emerged over the past two decades—that the answer is no. This is not to say that disputes cannot
be resolved on a classwide basis, or that class actions cannot be resolved by negotiated resolutions. Rather, this Article contends that if
a dispute is to be resolved on a classwide basis, then the resolution
should occur after a court has found the matter suitable for classwide
adjudication, regardless of settlement.
1 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class
Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 266 tbl.9 (2010) (in a sample of
state and federal court class action settlements, finding that 208 of 368, or fifty-seven percent,
were settlement class actions); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 819 (2010) (finding that sixtyeight percent of federal court class action settlements in 2006 and 2007 were settlement class
actions); see also HILARY HEHMAN, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF
CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, 2000–2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT 11 n.23 (2009) (in a
study of California state court class actions, finding that 228 of 289 certified class actions with a
disposition, or seventy-nine percent, were “certified as part of the settlement itself”); EMERY G.
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS
ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 11 tbl.9 (2008) (finding, in a pre-2005 sample of federal court
diversity class actions, twenty class actions (or fifty-nine percent) certified for purposes of settlement effectuation, four (or twelve percent) certified for purposes of settlement negotiation, and
six (or eighteen percent) certified for litigation). Virtually all certified class actions are resolved
either as settlement class actions or as litigation class actions that settle, rather than by adjudication. See id. at 11 (finding zero certified class actions in the sample that reached any disposition
other than settlement).
2 Settlement class actions—that is, class actions certified solely for settlement—should
not be confused with litigation class actions that reach settlement. If a court certifies a class
action for purposes of litigation and the parties then reach a negotiated resolution, the result is a
class action settlement. Standard class action settlements raise plenty of interesting issues, but
they are not the subject of this Article. This Article addresses the more problematic—and more
common—phenomenon of settlement class actions.
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Part I describes the core problem of settlement class actions—an
asymmetric settlement dynamic that disadvantages class members.
Whereas the litigation class action works as a tool of plaintiff empowerment, the settlement class action cuts the other way, entrenching
power in the defendants. In a settlement class action, the defendant
seeks closure on the cheap by taking advantage of the absence of class
members and the weak bargaining position of would-be class counsel.
Part I.A spells out the problem of would-be class counsel’s inadequate leverage when negotiating on behalf of absent class members.
This leverage problem has two components. First, without plenary
class certification, the lawyer negotiating a settlement class action
lacks the authority to take the class claims to trial. Without this authority, she cannot make the threat that implicitly or explicitly drives
every other litigation compromise. Second, the lawyer negotiating a
settlement class action faces a defendant who can negotiate instead
with other would-be class lawyers. In other words, in a settlement
class action, the defendant possesses the power of a monopsonistic
purchaser of res judicata who can negotiate with whichever would-be
class lawyer is willing to strike a deal. The disadvantage to the plaintiffs’ lawyer in a settlement class action is even worse than the standard monopsony disadvantage to sellers, because until the lawyer
strikes a deal, she does not even have the thing she wishes to sell.
Part I.B shows that courts mischaracterize the leverage problem
as a risk of collusion. But this focus on conspiratorial wrongdoing
frames the inquiry too narrowly. What is fundamentally problematic
about settlement-only classes is not that defendants are likely to make
explicit agreements with class counsel to disserve the class. Rather,
the problem is that the defendant’s interest aligns with the interest of
the would-be class lawyer. Both crave a comprehensive resolution,
even if it undervalues the claims of absent class members.
Focusing on the power that ultimately binds absent class members to a negotiated settlement, Part II turns to the illegitimacy of
settlement class actions as an exercise of judicial authority. Part II.A
looks at courts’ misleading use of contract terminology to describe
class settlements and points out the inadequacy of settlement class actions as a form of adjudication. In a settlement class action, the court
neither adjudicates the merits of the dispute nor effectuates a resolution negotiated by an individual with the power of class representation. Because of the asymmetry built into every settlement class
negotiation, settlement class actions lack justification as an exercise of
judicial power and raise due process concerns about the adequacy of

954

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:951

representation. Part II.B considers the problem of settlement class
actions in federal court under the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”).3 Unlike class actions that settle after plenary class certification,4 settlement-only class actions cannot survive the statutory stricture that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”5 The very act of certifying a settlement class alters
the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties.6 Thus, Parts I and
II argue that, as a matter of litigation policy and as a matter of properly construing a procedural rule, class settlement should occur only if
the class has been certified for purposes of litigation.
Part III examines recent developments in settlement class actions
and suggests that courts and others are moving in the wrong direction
by bending the certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 237 to facilitate the use of these settlement-only classes.
Part III.A looks at two recent Second and Third Circuit decisions that
picked up on Supreme Court dicta from Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor8 and extended it to disputes unsuitable for class resolution.
In Amchem, the Supreme Court demanded that any settlement class
action meet the class certification requirements of Rule 23,9 but the
Court granted the possibility of ignoring trial manageability when certifying a settlement class.10 In so ruling, the Supreme Court deviated
from the approach taken by the Third Circuit, which would have permitted a settlement class action only if the class could be certified for
trial.11 The Supreme Court’s opinion, although presented as a modest
“modification” of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning,12 created a narrow
opening that courts have since expanded. In In re American International Group, Inc. Securities Litigation (“AIG”),13 the Second Circuit
held that a settlement class action could be approved even if the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012).
By “plenary class certification,” I mean certification of a class action for purposes of
litigation. Such class certification does not, of course, mean that the case will reach a judgment
after trial; most certified class actions result in settlement. But plenary class certification means
that the court has authorized the representatives to litigate on behalf of the class.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 85–92.
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
8 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
10 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619–20 (“[A] district court need not inquire whether the case, if
tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal is that there be no
trial.” (citation omitted)).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 619.
13 In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. (AIG), 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012).
3
4
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fraud-on-the-market doctrine did not apply, which would have rendered the class uncertifiable for trial.14 In Sullivan v. DB Investments,
Inc. (“DeBeers”),15 an antitrust case involving the diamond wholesaler
DeBeers, the Third Circuit approved a nationwide settlement class action despite state law variations that permitted indirect purchasers to
assert claims in some states but not others, an intraclass conflict that
likely would have rendered the nationwide class uncertifiable for
trial.16
The holdings and language of these cases suggest not just a modest consideration of settlement when approving settlement class actions, as Amchem condoned, but rather a full-throated endorsement
of global resolutions even for disputes otherwise unsuitable for class
treatment. The sounder approach would be to permit class settlement
only after plenary class certification. Instead, these recent cases extended Amchem to permit class settlement in a wider range of disputes that are not only uncertified, but uncertifiable.
Part III.B turns from judicial opinions to rule proposals. The
American Law Institute (“ALI”) has proposed facilitating settlement
classes by permitting settlement class certification notwithstanding uncertifiability for trial.17 Similarly, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules is considering a suggestion that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 be amended to ease settlement class certification.18 What drives
14 Id. at 232. The fraud-on-the-market theory allows securities-fraud plaintiffs to invoke a
rebuttable presumption of classwide reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding
securities traded in an efficient market. Id. at 234 n.3. The district court had rejected the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption to the AIG case, but the Second Circuit declined to rule on this question in light of its determination that a settlement class action would be
permissible even if the fraud-on-the-market doctrine were inapplicable. See infra text accompanying notes 112–20. On the importance of the fraud-on-the-market presumption to class certification, see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013).
15 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
16 Id. at 285, 303–04. The court did not explicitly rule that the state law variations would
have made the case uncertifiable for trial, but it acknowledged serious variations and dismissed
those concerns as “largely irrelevant to certification of a settlement class.” Id. at 304 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see infra text accompanying notes 121–35. On the importance of state
law variations to class certification, see Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 589–94
(9th Cir. 2012); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018
(7th Cir. 2002).
17 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.06 & cmt.
a (2010); see also infra Part III.B.1.
18 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 32 (Mar. 22–23, 2012), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV03-2012-min.pdf (listing the following as one of the top five topics on the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s agenda: “Should there be
criteria for certifying a settlement class different from the criteria for certifying a litigation
class?”); see also infra Part III.B.2.
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these proposals is an alignment of interests among defendants, judges,
and plaintiffs’ lawyers, all of whom favor comprehensive—rather than
piecemeal—resolutions of disputes.19 This Article contends that these
proposals ought to be rejected, and that the sounder approach is one
that permits class settlement only in the shadow of class litigation—
that is, only after plenary class certification.
Some will object that a prohibition on settlement class actions
will mean the loss of worthwhile mass resolutions. If defendants are
willing to pay for the peace that class settlements bring, the argument
goes, why not allow courts to effectuate such resolutions? Why should
money be left on the table? My response is that if a class action provides the superior means of dispute resolution, then the court should
certify it for purposes of litigation; a settlement reached after such
certification would not suffer from the structural deficits enumerated
in this Article. If the problem is that courts have gone too far in restricting litigation class actions—and there are strong arguments that
this is the case20—then these arguments should be aimed at the standard for class certification,21 the enforcement of class waivers in contracts of adhesion,22 and other obstacles that stand in the way of
19 One can understand why each of these three dominant sets of players would prefer
comprehensive resolutions. For a defendant, this preference is driven by the desire to limit liability, to prevent escalating litigation costs, and to reassure capital markets by resolving outstanding liability in such a fashion that the remaining risk can be quantified. For the judge, it is
about docket control as well as the professional accomplishment of achieving a satisfying resolution to a mass dispute. And for plaintiff’s counsel, it is about the potential for substantial fees, as
well as the satisfaction of obtaining compensation for one’s clients. See Howard Erichson, Public and Private Law Perspectives: Transcript of Professor Howard Erichson, 37 SW. U. L. REV.
665, 666–67 (2008). The problem is that claimants themselves may or may not get the full benefit
of the comprehensive resolutions that these other players find so satisfying. See id. at 667; see
also James A. Henderson, Jr., Comment: Settlement Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1021 (1995) (“Settlement class actions are attractive to judges, defendants, and plaintiffs’ counsel because they serve the interests of all three constituencies. One
may fairly suspect that these interests may be served only if the interests of future plaintiffs are
devalued.”).
20 For an extensive discussion of the ways in which courts have restricted class actions, and
for suggestions of ways that class certification could sensibly be eased, see generally Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013). See also Myriam Gilles
& Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–52 (2012) (discussing judicial enforcement of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements).
21 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (emphasizing the burden of proof placed on movants for class certification); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541, 2550–57 (2011) (raising the bar on Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement).
22 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of class action prohibitions in arbitration
clauses notwithstanding impingement on vindication of federal rights); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
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plenary class certification. If more class certifications are needed,
then the solution is to certify more classes, not to bypass plenary class
certification in favor of a settlement-only process that disfavors class
members and encourages exploitation by defendants.
The problem of settlement class actions is hardly new to the literature.23 It bears examination now because recent court decisions
seem to have lost sight of what makes settlement class actions problematic, and because recent reform proposals would push even further
in the wrong direction. If this Article discourages further moves toward facilitating settlement class actions, and if it sparks a reexamination of whether settlement-only class certification constitutes a
legitimate exercise of judicial authority, then it will have done its job.
I.
A.

THE LEVERAGE PROBLEM

Selling Something That One Does Not Have

In a settlement class action, would-be class counsel negotiates to
resolve the claims of class members.24 If the negotiation succeeds, the
deal offers peace for the defendant, compensation for class members,
and fees for class counsel. If the negotiation fails, class counsel cannot
simply take the class claims to trial. By definition, a settlement class
action is negotiated at a time when the class has not yet been certified.
At the time of the negotiation, the lawyer does not represent the
plaintiff class,25 but rather negotiates from the position of one who
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
state law regarding the unconscionability of class action prohibitions in arbitration clauses).
23 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.06 reporters’ notes; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1378–82 (1995);
Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2002–03
(1999); Henderson, supra note 19, at 1014; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in
the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 388; Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The
Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1998); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1051–85 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George
M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1113–14 (1996); Richard L. Marcus,
They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 898–901
(1995); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Actions
Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 447–76 (1996).
24 See Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-orControversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545,
546 (2006).
25 On the powerlessness of putative class representatives to bind the class, see Standard
Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013). In Standard Fire, the Court rejected a
precertification stipulation limiting the amount in controversy for purposes of subject matter
jurisdiction, because the putative representative’s stipulation “d[id] not speak for those he purport[ed] to represent. That is because a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally
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hopes to be granted the franchise. The lawyer becomes an agent for
the class only if she reaches agreement with the defendant and succeeds in seeking court approval.
In that sense, a lawyer negotiating a settlement class action is selling something that she does not have. She is offering to sell the defendant peace from the class members’ claims even though she does not
yet represent the class members and cannot take the class claims to
trial. This does not necessarily mean the transaction is a sham, because if the settlement class action succeeds, then indeed the defendant gets the peace that the defendant bargained for. But it does
make the negotiation steeply asymmetrical. The asymmetry derives
from two related problems—the lack of a credible trial threat and the
defendant’s monopsony power—each of which deprives the plaintiffs’
lawyer of leverage.
First, if a class has not been certified for purposes of litigation,
then the would-be class lawyer negotiates from a position of weakness
because she cannot threaten to take the class claims to trial.26 Without
the power to take the class claims to trial, the lawyer purporting to
negotiate on behalf of absent class members lacks the leverage that is
essential on both sides of any litigation compromise. Although she
may offer something of value to the defendant, she has no viable alternative to a negotiated agreement,27 at least not if she wishes to represent the class. The point is not that the plaintiffs’ lawyer has zero
leverage,28 but rather that the leverage is low enough to put the plainbind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.” Id. at 1348–49; see also Smith
v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379–81 (2011) (holding that absent class members, as nonparties, are not bound by a denial of class certification).
26 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
27 On the importance of a negotiator’s “BATNA,” or “Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement,” see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1983) (1981).
28 First of all, in a settlement class action, the plaintiffs’ lawyer is offering the defendant
something of real value—classwide res judicata—so the defendant may be willing to offer a
substantial sum even if there are other plaintiffs’ lawyers with whom the defendant could strike a
deal. Second, a class settlement binds only if a court finds the settlement “fair, reasonable, and
adequate,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2), so the negotiating parties are wise not to make the deal too
cheap, and defendants are apt to put real money on the table notwithstanding their advantage in
the negotiation. Third, the lawyer negotiating a settlement class action may represent numerous
individual clients, may possess a leadership role in the multidistrict litigation or other consolidated proceedings, and may be well positioned to negotiate on behalf of a consortium of lawyers
representing a significant constituency of claimants. Such representation and coordination may
allow the lawyer to negotiate from a position of strength regardless of class certification. See
infra note 147 and accompanying text. These arguments suggest that plaintiffs’ counsel can exert
some force on defendants when negotiating mass resolutions. But they do not answer whether
settlement-only class actions offer a sound way to reach such resolutions. If settlement class
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tiffs’ lawyer at a systematic disadvantage. The disadvantage is reduced in a case where the class is certifiable, but given the
uncertainties of class certification and appointment of class counsel,
the disadvantage is erased only if the class is actually certified.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the leverage problem in
Amchem, offering the concern as one basis for requiring that settlement class actions meet the class certification requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b):
[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b),29 and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class
counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of
litigation to press for a better offer . . . .30
Had the Court followed the point to its logical conclusion, it
would have required litigation class certification as a prerequisite to
any class settlement. But the Court stopped short of even the more
modest conclusion that any settlement class action should be certifiable for litigation purposes. Instead, the Court required that a settlement class action meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) for
class certification, with the qualification that proponents of a settlement class action need not establish trial manageability for purposes
of Rule 23(b)(3).31 This dicta opened the door just enough for lawyers
to pursue class settlements in otherwise uncertifiable disputes, and recent cases seem to have pushed that door wide open.32
Second, if the class has not been certified and the negotiating lawyer has not been appointed as class counsel,33 the defendant carries
actions impose a structural disadvantage on the class because would-be class counsel must reach
agreement or be deprived of the franchise, and if they involve an assertion of judicial power that
is premised on the presumed legitimacy of the underlying negotiation, then they fail the legitimacy test notwithstanding the existence of some bases for leverage. See infra notes 73–81 and
accompanying text.
29 Rule 23(e) governs court approval of the settlement of class actions that are qualified
for certification under Rule 23(a) and (b). Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus on whether a proposed
class has “sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
30 Id. (citing Coffee, supra note 23, at 1379–80). The reviewing court would likewise be
“disarmed” because it would “face a bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial investigation.” Id.
31

See id. at 619–20; see also infra text accompanying notes 105–06.

32

See infra text accompanying notes 111–35.

33

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (addressing appointment of class counsel).
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the advantage of monopsony power.34 That is, there is a single buyer
(the defendant) and multiple potential sellers (lawyers willing to represent the class in a settlement class action). The defendant can
strike a deal with any of numerous lawyers who would gladly fill the
role of settlement class counsel, while any would-be class counsel must
negotiate with the same defendant. Thus, the subtext of any settlement class action negotiation is that the would-be class counsel knows
that if she does not strike a deal on terms acceptable to the defendant,
the defendant can simply walk away and strike a more favorable deal
with a different lawyer. This is what John Coffee identified as the
“reverse auction” problem.35 As Coffee put it, “settlement class actions permit defendants to run a reverse auction, seeking the lowest
bidder from a large population of plaintiffs’ attorneys.”36 One need
not picture an actual auction, of course. Nor need there be more than
one actual bidder. The point is that defendant’s threat of striking a
deal with a different class lawyer is implicit, from the start, in the very
nature of a settlement class action negotiation.
The settlement class action presents a particularly troubling kind
of monopsony problem. There are multiple would-be sellers, but they
do not have the thing they wish to sell. Specifically, they are negotiating to sell releases from the class members’ claims, but they do not
actually represent the class because no class has yet been certified.
None of the would-be class lawyers has been empowered to litigate
the class claims.37 The settlement class action lawyer, negotiating to
sell something that she does not yet have, has only one way to get the
thing she wishes to sell, and that is by striking a deal.
The federal class action rule contains a device that offers a partial
solution to this leverage problem. Under Rule 23(g)(3), a court may
designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class prior to
34 See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1081–82 (2013).
35 John C. Coffee Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at
A15 [hereinafter Coffee, Corruption]; see also Coffee, supra note 23, at 1370, 1379.
36

Coffee, Corruption, supra note 35; see also Coffee, supra note 23, at 1379.

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 398–99 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (highlighting, for consideration on remand, the argument “that the Delaware [class] representatives undervalued the federal claims—claims they
could only settle, but never litigate, in a Delaware court”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 854
(1995) (“The consequence, however, is a profound imbalance that denies even well-meaning
plaintiffs’ attorneys any leverage in settlement negotiations. Put simply, plaintiffs’ attorneys in
such a setting have only a limited franchise: they can settle, but not fight.”).
37
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class certification.38 Designation of interim counsel not only resolves
uncertainties about moving forward with discovery and motion practice, but it also positions a lawyer or group of lawyers to negotiate on
behalf of the putative class.39 The designation of interim counsel to
negotiate a settlement class action thus reduces the risk of reverse
auction by specifying who may negotiate on behalf of the putative
class.40 In combination with the Class Action Fairness Act of 200541
and multidistrict litigation transfer,42 which both reduce the likelihood
of competing class actions in multiple courts, Rule 23(g) offers a
mechanism for consolidating the power of a single representative to
negotiate on behalf of a putative class. Designation of interim counsel
does nothing, however, to resolve the problem of counsel’s uncertain
ability to take the class claims to trial. Nor does it completely eliminate the reverse auction problem, unless no other lawyer could step in
to represent the class in the event that the defendant’s negotiations
with interim counsel fail. Although the designation of interim counsel
does not end the problems of settlement class actions,43 it offers a valuable means for courts to reduce the defendant’s monopsony power.
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3) (“The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a
putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
39 The 2003 Advisory Committee’s note makes it clear that, while interim designation may
be useful for resolving rivalries and uncertainties, such designation is not a precondition to working on behalf of a putative class:
Failure to make the formal designation does not prevent the attorney who filed the
action from proceeding in it. Whether or not formally designated interim counsel,
an attorney who acts on behalf of the class before certification must act in the best
interests of the class as a whole. For example, an attorney who negotiates a precertification settlement must seek a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendments.
40 Richard Marcus suggested this advantage of interim designation well before Rule 23
was amended to make the process an explicit part of the rule. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 898
(“One difficulty can be avoided if the court at least selects and deputizes class counsel. It has
long been recognized that the defendant may otherwise have an opportunity for lawyer-shopping. This problem can be solved if the court’s approval is sought before the lawyer purports to
bind the class to even a tentative settlement.” (footnote omitted)).
41 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (expanding federal subject matter
jurisdiction over class actions); id. § 1453 (facilitating removal of class actions from state court to
federal court).
42 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (permitting transfer of related actions to a single federal district
court for coordinated pretrial proceedings).
43 Note that while Rule 23(g)(3) offers a partial solution to the leverage concerns raised in
this Article (addressing the monopsony problem but not the trial problem), it does nothing to
resolve the problem with settlement class actions under the Rules Enabling Act. See infra text
accompanying notes 84–87.
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A Problem of Leverage, Not Collusion

Judicial opinions on settlement class actions acknowledge that
courts must attend to the potential alignment of interest between class
counsel and the defendant, but they rarely discuss this in terms of the
systematic asymmetry that inheres in class counsel’s inability to take
the class claims to trial, or in class counsel’s vulnerability to being undersold. Instead, courts tend to describe the concern in terms of a risk
of collusion.44
When certifying settlement class actions, judges proudly report
that they find “no evidence of collusion.”45 In the settlement class
action resolving BP’s liability for the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, for example, the district judge declared: “There is no evidence whatsoever
of any fraud or collusion in the negotiation of the Settlement.
Rather, . . . any suggestion of fraud or collusion is baseless.”46 Similarly, in DeBeers the Third Circuit rejected concerns about the fairness
of the antitrust settlement class action with a dismissive wave: “No
assertion of collusion, fraud, or overreaching is advanced or evidenced
in the settlement at issue here.”47 The court’s thin view of its role in
protecting the class from collusion seemed to be founded on the notion that a settlement class action should be understood as a private
contract. “[W]e must remain cognizant,” the court noted, “that our
‘intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be limited to the extent
44 I have been guilty of this as well, referring to the alignment of interests between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants, in both settlement class actions and all-or-nothing aggregate settlements, as a “collusion problem.” See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing
Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1020–22 (2010).
45 See, e.g., Shames v. Hertz Corp., No. 07-CV-2174-MMA(WMC), 2012 WL 5392159, at
*13 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012) (“[T]he Court finds no evidence of collusion in the settlement
process.”); Gallucci v. Boiron, Inc., No. 11cv2039JAH(NLS), 2012 WL 5359485, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 31, 2012) (“The Court finds that there is no evidence of collusion in the settlement.”);
Milligan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09–05418 RS, 2012 WL 10277179, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (“There is absolutely no evidence of collusion between the parties in arriving at
the proposed settlement.”); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 393
(1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Addressing the objectors’ contention that the proposed settlement was ‘collusive,’ the Vice Chancellor . . . noted, the
‘[o]bjectors have offered no evidence of any collusion,’ so he declined to reject the settlement on
that ground.”).
46 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., 910 F. Supp. 2d 891,
931 (E.D. La. 2012) (approving economic benefits settlement class action); see also In re Oil Spill
by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., 295 F.R.D. 112, 147 (E.D. La. 2013) (approving medical benefits settlement class action and noting that “[n]o objector has provided evidence
of collusion”).
47

Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 325 n.58 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the
product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties.’ ”48
But what exactly do courts expect to find? “Collusion” denotes a
secret agreement for a wrongful purpose.49 Do judges expect to find a
nefarious conspiracy between defendants and class counsel? If there
were such a conspiracy to disserve the class, then certainly it would be
a basis for denying class certification and rejecting a settlement.50 But
as a general matter, collusion so defined is a red herring. The issue
that matters in the vast run of settlement class actions is neither collusion nor other forms of bad faith, but rather the structural problem of
lack of leverage.51
Unfortunately, framing the problem as one of collusion tends to
supplant any consideration of leverage as a structural problem. The
Federal Judicial Center’s class action pocket guide for judges, for example, conflates the reverse auction problem with collusion. In a sec-

48 Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also
id. at 336–37 (Scirica, J., concurring) (“The principal danger of collusion lies in the prospect that
class counsel, induced by defendants’ offer of attorneys’ fees, will ‘trade away’ the claims of
some or all class members for inadequate compensation.”). On the error of turning to contract
principles to legitimize class settlements, see infra Part II.A.
49 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “collusion” as follows: “Secret agreement or
understanding for purposes of trickery or fraud; underhand scheming or working with another;
deceit, fraud, trickery.” 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 491 (2d ed. 1989). Others similarly define “collusion” in terms of both secrecy and wrongfulness, and in the legal context, as a
secret agreement between purportedly adverse parties: “1. secret agreement for a fraudulent
purpose; connivance; conspiracy 2. a secret agreement between opponents at law in order to
obtain a judicial decision for some wrongful or improper purpose.” Collusion Definition, COLLINSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/collusive (last visited
May 20, 2014); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000) (“A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or
deceitful purpose.”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining
collusion as a “secret agreement or cooperation esp. for an illegal or deceitful purpose”).
50 See, e.g., Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45 (D. Me. 2005) (“[K]ey provisions of the Amended Settlement Agreement, which were finalized by the parties after the mediation session, combine to form an agreement that appears collusive on its face and in practice.
Specifically, the Court remains troubled by the combination of the reverter clause and the clear
sailing provision. In concert, the Court believes that these two provisions give rise to inferences
that there was a lack of arm’s length negotiations and a lack of zealous advocacy for the Class by
Plaintiffs’ counsel.”).
51 John Coffee, articulating the reverse auction concern, recognized that the problem does
not depend on bad faith: “Even in the absence of bad faith, suspect settlements result in large
measure because of the defendants’ ability to shop for favorable settlement terms, either by
contacting multiple plaintiffs’ attorneys or by inducing them to compete against each other.”
Coffee, supra note 23, at 1354.
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tion entitled “Collusion: ‘Reverse auctions’ and the like,”52 it offers
this definition of the problem: “ ‘Reverse auction’ is the label for a
defendant’s collusive selection of the weakest attorney among a number of plaintiff attorneys who have filed lawsuits dealing with the same
subject matter . . . .”53 It advises that “[d]etermining whether a reverse auction might have occurred requires information about all litigation dealing with the subject of the dispute.”54
The Pocket Guide misses the crucial point about the defendant’s
lopsided power. The point is not so much that courts should look to
see “whether a reverse auction might have occurred,” as the pamphlet
puts it.55 Rather, the point is that a reverse auction dynamic is implicit
in the negotiation of a settlement class action. One need not look for
whether multiple bidders actually participated; one need only know
that the first bidder negotiated from a position of weakness because
other potential bidders were out there, and the bidder sought to sell
something that she did not have unless her bid was accepted.
Some judges understand that the core concern is not collusion in
the narrow sense of a conspiracy to disserve the class, but rather the
defendant’s ability to take advantage of disempowered plaintiffs’
counsel. In Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp.,56 for example, the district court rejected a proposed settlement that was reached prior to
class certification. In evaluating the procedural fairness of the settlement, the court quickly moved past the question of “fraud or collusion” and focused instead on the disadvantaged position of plaintiffs’
counsel, whose only viable path to hold onto their case was to strike a
deal for global peace on terms acceptable to the defendant:
There is no evidence of fraud or collusion between Class
Counsel and counsel for Sharper Image. That concern may
be quickly disposed of. What cannot be so easily eliminated
is the perception, and the undersigned’s conviction, that
Sharper Image selected counsel confronted with a most precarious position, insisted upon amendments to the pleading
to broaden the scope of this litigation to obtain a global
peace, and then proceeded to offer and convince Class

52 BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 20 (3d ed. 2010).
53

Id. at 21 (citing MANUAL

54

Id.

55

See id.

56

Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007).

FOR

COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.61 (2004)).
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Counsel to accept highly undesirable terms to settle the
case.57
The settlement came at a moment in the Figueroa litigation when
the plaintiffs were vulnerable to a stay or dismissal because their action was undifferentiated from certain related lawsuits.58 The fact that
Sharper Image struck a deal with plaintiffs’ counsel for global peace,
rather than renew its request to abate or dismiss the lawsuit, signaled
to the court that the defendant was taking advantage of counsel for
whom a settlement class action was the only viable strategy for staying
in the game.59 “Thus, Plaintiffs’ counsel necessarily negotiated from a
position of weakness, with the specter of a stay of this case a constant
companion.”60 The court in Figueroa recognized the dynamics of the
negotiation and appropriately looked beyond the narrow question of
collusion.
Similarly, in Dennis v. Kellogg Co.,61 the Ninth Circuit considered
the risks presented by settlement class actions in broader terms than
collusion. Rejecting a settlement that would have provided a questionable cy pres remedy, the court noted the importance of looking
beyond explicit collusion:
[W]here . . . class counsel negotiates a settlement agreement
before the class is even certified, courts “must be particularly
vigilant not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own
self-interests and that of certain class members to infect the
negotiations.”62
The fundamental problem of settlement class actions is not about
the negotiating attorney’s competence or good faith (although both
are necessary). Rather, the deeper problem is the steep asymmetry of
power inherent in the very structure of settlement-only class
certification.
57

Id. at 1321.

58

Id. at 1321–22.

Id. at 1322 (“Instead of [a motion to abate or to dismiss] occurring, however, and prior
to any decision on class certification, Sharper Image began and pursued negotiations with Plaintiffs’ counsel, doing so with sealed filings and proceedings on the eve of a class certification
process, abandoning its earlier efforts to have the case stayed. Plaintiffs’ counsel were fully
aware that a request for a stay might very well be granted . . . .”).
59

60

Id.

61

Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012).

Id. at 864 (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
62
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SETTLEMENT CLASS CERTIFICATION

Neither Contract nor Adjudication

Thus far, this Article has argued that settlement class actions suffer from a problem of asymmetrical leverage, and that the problem is
structural. One might ask, so what? Plenty of negotiations are asymmetrical. We do not expect markets to offer perfect fairness, so why
should we worry about the fact that a settlement class action gives
defendants a structural advantage over the class? The answer is that
settlement class actions, unlike other negotiated resolutions, bind
solely through the exercise of judicial power. They are not merely
(and arguably not even) a market mechanism. Although settlement
class actions result from private negotiation, they bind only by the authority of the court. The court, however, does not adjudicate the merits of the dispute, instead ruling only on the rough fairness of a deal
that the court presumes reflects market price. A settlement class action entails an exercise of judicial power premised on a proxy negotiation.63 Thus, much depends upon whether the proxy negotiation
deserves a presumption of fairness.
Courts routinely and misleadingly describe class settlements using
the language of contract.64 In the DeBeers antitrust case, the Third
Circuit put it this way:
It is well established that “settlement agreements are
creatures of private contract law.” . . . Thus, a district court’s
certification of a settlement simply recognizes the parties’
deliberate decision to bind themselves according to mutually
agreed-upon terms without engaging in any substantive adjudication of the underlying causes of action.65
63 Richard Marcus has made both of these points, distinguishing settlement class actions
from ordinary settlements both because they involve negotiation by proxies and because they
achieve resolution by an exercise of judicial power:
Outside the class action area, the policy in favor of settlement usually looks to
encouraging the parties themselves to settle, not appointing proxies to negotiate a
settlement in their absence. . . . Denying class action status in no way prevents the
parties from settling their cases, but they must do it by actual agreement rather
than in gross by judicial fiat.
Marcus, supra note 23, at 900.
64 See, e.g., Smith v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 3:11-1055, 2012 WL 1567201, at *5 (M.D.
Tenn. May 2, 2012) (“A class action settlement, like an agreement resolving any other legal
claim, is a private contract negotiated between the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting
Bauer v. Transitional Sch. Dist. of St. Louis, 255 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2001)). The DeBeers
Court, treating the settlement class action as if it were a consensual settlement, assumed that the
settlement values reflected the likelihood of a favorable outcome if the case were litigated: “[I]n
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Concurring Judge Anthony Scirica echoed the same idea: “Settlement of a class action is not an adjudication of the merits of the members’ claims. It is a contract between the parties governed by the
requirements of Rule 23[ ] . . . and establishes a contractual obligation
as well as a contractual defense against future claims.”66
When the court says that a class settlement simply recognizes the
parties’ “deliberate decision to bind themselves,” who does it imagine
has made this “deliberate decision”? Surely not the class members.
In a class action, the absent class members make no such decision.
Judge Scirica’s description of a class settlement as “a contract between
the parties” is similarly misguided—class action settlements do not
work like contracts. Contracts bind because of the voluntary agreement of those who are bound.67 A class action settlement binds all
members of the certified class even though virtually none of the class
members have agreed to it.68 Here, we must distinguish those who
reaching a private consensual settlement, the ‘parties, counsel, mediators, and district judges
naturally arrive at a reasonable range for settlement by considering the likelihood of a plaintiffs’
or defense verdict, the potential recovery, and the chances of obtaining it, discounted to present
value.’ ” Id. at 325 n.58 (quoting Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir.
2009)). The court failed to mention, however, the crucial difference between the likelihood of
individual verdicts and the likelihood of a class verdict. Of course settlement negotiations occur
in the shadow of predictions regarding litigation outcomes, but the key factor distinguishing
settlement class actions is that the negotiator—would-be class counsel—lacks the power to take
the class claims to trial.
66 Id. at 338 (Scirica, J., concurring).
67 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[C]ontractual obligations are entirely voluntary.”); DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 907 (Wis.
2012) (“The underpinning of contract law is that competent parties are permitted to bind themselves to voluntary agreements . . . .”). See generally Aditi Bagchi, Voluntariness and Contract
Interpretation (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/privatelaw/related-content/bagchi_voluntariness_and_contract_interpretation.pdf
(exploring what it means to describe a contract as voluntary, and the significance of voluntariness for the interpretation of contractual terms).
68 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B)(v), class members have the opportunity to exclude themselves from a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3), and this “opt-out”
right arguably constitutes tacit agreement. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
810–14 (1985) (holding the opt-out right, along with other due process protections, sufficient to
support personal jurisdiction over absent class members). There is a big difference, however,
between actual agreement and a failure to opt out, particularly in light of the typically very low
opt-out rates in class actions. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs
and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1532 (2004) (explaining empirical finding that less than one percent of class members opt
out). It is also worth noting that class action settlements negotiated after class certification ordinarily bind class members without providing any opportunity to opt out because the opt-out
period would have passed prior to the settlement. Jeannette Cox, Note, Information Famine,
Due Process, and the Revised Class Action Rule: When Should Courts Provide a Second Opportunity to Opt Out?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2004). However, class members retain
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agreed from those who did not. The defendant, the would-be class
lawyer, and perhaps the named plaintiffs actually agreed to a deal.
When defendants attempt to back out of class settlement deals, courts
understandably invoke contract principles to hold them to the agreed
upon terms; this aspect of binding defendants may explain some of the
language of contract that has crept into class action jurisprudence.69
The invocation of contract principles to prevent backtracking by a
party who affirmatively agreed to a settlement, however, is a far cry
from the invocation of such principles to bind absentees.70
If contract principles cannot explain the binding effect of a class
settlement, then what does? Why does the settlement bind the class
members? It binds them because the court says so. What binds the
class is not the agreement between the defendant and the lead plaintiffs or class counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that
agreement.71 The binding effect of a class settlement, in other words,
the right to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions that are certified solely for settlement. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note (“The opportunity to request exclusion from a proposed
settlement is limited to members of a (b)(3) class. Exclusion may be requested only by individual class members; no class member may purport to opt out other class members by way of
another class action.”).
69 For example, in Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2010), defendant
Verizon agreed to a class settlement but then moved to vacate the court’s preliminary approval
of that settlement when new legislation weakened the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 592. The court of
appeals, appropriately invoking contract principles, held that Verizon could not back out of the
deal:
The requirement that a district court review and approve a class action settlement
before it binds all class members does not affect the binding nature of the parties’
underlying agreement. Put another way, judicial approval of a class action settlement is a condition subsequent to the contract and does not affect the legality of
the proposed settlement agreement.
Id. at 593 (citation omitted); see also In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:07-CV 208, 2011 WL
3878332, at *4–5 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2011) (expressing sympathy for the argument that the
defendant should be bound by the class settlement to which it had agreed, but ultimately granting the defendant’s motion to vacate because changed circumstances meant that the class certification requirements were no longer met).
70 In Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), the defendant Matsushita argued
that class members were bound by a settlement class action as a matter of contract because the
class had given a release. Id. at 666. The Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected this argument,
noting that “the settlement of a class action is fundamentally different from the settlement of
traditional litigation,” and that “Matsushita is simply wrong to assert that a ‘class’ may give a
release as part of a settlement.” Id. at 666–67.
71 See 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 1:6 (5th ed. 2011) (“The mechanics of the binding effect of the class action are
straightforward. If a class suit ends in a settlement, the court’s approval of that settlement following notice to the class, objections, and a fairness hearing results in a formally entered final
judgment.”); see also Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90
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must be understood as a function of judicial power. But adjudication
does not quite describe it either, at least not in the usual sense.72
Judges approving class settlements emphatically disavow any credit or
responsibility for determining the merits of the claims.73
This neither-fish-nor-fowl aspect of class settlements should give
us pause when thinking about settlement-only class actions. Settlement class actions come into being only by negotiation, but they bind
only by the court’s judgment. If the court’s judgment is not based on
adjudication of the underlying claims,74 then the legitimacy of this exercise of power depends upon the legitimacy of the negotiation out of
which the settlement class action is borne. The legitimacy of that negotiation as a basis for binding class members cannot be founded on
contract principles, because the class members did not agree to the
settlement. Nor can it be founded on agency principles, because the
lawyer purportedly negotiating for the class was never appointed by
the principals, and was appointed by the court as class counsel only
after the negotiation was completed.75
Despite the inability of adjudication principles, contract principles, or agency principles to explain the binding effect of settlement
WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1020–25 (2013) (contrasting class settlements, which take effect through
judicial action, from nonclass settlements).
72 On the fuzzy line between adjudication and settlement in the context of class settlements, see Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1123–24 (2009) (“[A class action settlement] is an adjudication giving
effect to a negotiated resolution, and it is a settlement effectuated by the court’s judgment.”).
73 See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 324 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(“[T]he court must ‘guard against demanding too large a settlement based on its view of the
merits of the litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of the highest hopes in
exchange for certainty and resolution.’ ” (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 806 (3d Cir. 1995))); id. at 338 (Scirica, J., concurring)
(“Settlement of a class action is not an adjudication of the merits of the members’ claims.”); In re
Sea Containers Ltd. Class Action Sec. Litig., No. 89-0930(JGP), 1990 WL 99307, at *11 (D.D.C.
July 6, 1990) (“This Court’s Order certifying the Settlement Classes and directing the Settlement
Hearing should not be construed or considered in any way as an expression or indication of the
Court’s views as to the merits of any claim or defenses asserted by any parties in this litigation.
The Court has not determined the merits of any of the issues in this Action.”); see also Owen M.
Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009) (distinguishing between
adjudication and judicial approval of a class settlement, as “a sharp distinction must be made
between a judgment of the court, after trial, as to what justice requires, and a judgment that what
the parties had agreed to is reasonable or within the ballpark”).
74 For an argument that settlement class actions in federal court are unconstitutional by
virtue of failing the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, see generally Redish & Kastanek, supra note 24. For a related argument that settlement class actions exceed the legitimate
bounds of adjudication, see generally Henderson, supra note 19.
75 On the possibility of court-appointed interim class counsel under Rule 23(g)(3), see
supra text accompanying notes 38–43.
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class actions, perhaps settlement class actions should be defended on
policy grounds because they offer a sound way to resolve certain mass
disputes. But this argument would require some basis on which to
trust the underlying negotiation. Judicial review offers a check against
abuses, but it is no substitute for a trustworthy negotiation to begin
with.76
Judicial evaluation of the fairness of class settlements begins with
a presumption of the fairness of arm’s length negotiations.77 The great
appeal of negotiated resolutions, in general, is that they offer a market
mechanism for determining the value of claims even as the merits of
those claims remain in dispute. But settlement class actions cannot
provide the market-based comfort required to support this exercise of
judicial power. As discussed above, asymmetry is built into the very
structure of a settlement class action, both because the class has not
been certified for trial and because the monopsony puts would-be
class counsel in the untenable position of needing to strike a deal for
the class in order to obtain the position of class counsel.78
In the end, the settlement class action binds the class only because of the judgment, but there is no sound basis for this exercise of
judicial power.79 It is not an adjudication on the merits. It is not the
enforcement of a compromise to which the claimants agreed. It is,
instead, a judicially binding restatement of an agreement negotiated
between a defendant and would-be class counsel. If the outcome of
that negotiation were entitled to a presumption of fairness because it
76 For a contrary argument that looks to judicial settlement review and objectors as antidotes to the leverage problem, see Griffith & Lahav, supra note 34, at 1121–24.
77 See, e.g., Guaman v. Ajna-Bar NYC, No. 12 Civ. 2987(DF), 2013 WL 445896, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2013) (“Absent fraud or collusion, [courts] should be hesitant to substitute
[their] judgment for that of the parties who negotiated the settlement.” (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at *4 (“A ‘presumption of fairness, adequacy and reasonableness may attach to a class settlement reached in arm’s-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery.’ ” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005))); Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:08-cv-2317, 2013
WL 84928, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2013) (“In this context, a ‘presumption of fairness’ applies if
the Court finds that settlement negotiations were conducted at arm’s length by experienced
counsel, that there was sufficient discovery, and that only a small percentage of class members
object.”); In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in Gulf of Mex., 910 F. Supp. 2d 891,
930–31 (E.D. La. 2012) (“Because the public interest strongly favors the voluntary settlement of
class actions, there is a strong presumption in favor of finding the settlement fair, reasonable,
and adequate.”).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 27–62.
79 James Henderson expressed this insight even before Amchem had made its way up to
the Supreme Court: “Settlement class actions are inherently unlawful because they clearly, and
one is tempted to say unnecessarily, exceed the legitimate limits of adjudication.” Henderson,
supra note 19, at 1014.
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represented a market valuation of claims under circumstances in
which classwide resolution provided a superior means of resolving the
dispute, then one could see the argument in favor of judicial enforcement of the resolution. But the structure, and inherent power asymmetry, of settlement class actions renders any such presumption of
fairness impossible.
Class certification requires adequate representation.80 So does
the preclusive effect of any class judgment as a matter of due process.81 Regardless of skill, diligence, and good faith, it is difficult to
see how any lawyer or putative class representative negotiating a settlement class action can provide adequate representation in light of
the structural shortcomings of the settlement class action form. Settlement class actions present a client-lawyer conflict of interest.82 The
lawyer wishes to reach a deal with the defendant and obtains the class
franchise only if she does so, but she lacks the leverage to negotiate
adequately on behalf of the class.
B.

The Rules Enabling Act

An interpretation of Rule 23 that permits settlement-only class
certification presents problems under the REA.83 Under the REA, no
federal rule of civil procedure may “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”84 Because a settlement class action offers neither
an adjudication on the merits of the class members’ claims nor a compromise by one with the power to pursue those claims to adjudication,
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (stating requirement that “the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
81 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900–01 (2008) (considering various factors to determine whether party’s representation of nonparty is “adequate” for purposes of preclusion); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–45 (1940) (holding class action judgment cannot bind absent
parties unless they were adequately represented by present parties); see also Alexandra D.
Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 545 (2012)
(“Whatever due process doctrine generally requires, for class actions it requires this: No absent
class member can be bound by a class action judgment without adequate representation.”).
82 For purposes of adequate representation in class actions, client-lawyer conflicts arguably matter more than client-client conflicts. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class
Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 597.
83 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012).
84 Id. § 2072(b). It makes sense to focus on the federal rule because the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) made federal courts the dominant forum for large-scale class
actions in the United States. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS:
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 1–2 (2008) (finding seventy-two percent increase in class action activity in district courts
since CAFA’s enactment).
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settlement-only class certification constitutes an impermissible modification of substantive rights via Rule 23.
In this regard, settlement class actions differ fundamentally from
litigation class actions, including litigation class actions that end in settlement. The class action rule, to the extent it allows adjudication of
substantive rights through representative litigation, does not run afoul
of the REA constraint. Class certification transforms the method by
which claims may be presented for adjudication, and it transforms
how those claims may be settled along the way to such adjudication,
but it does not alter the rights to be adjudicated.
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
85 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion defended the class action rule
Co.,
on the grounds that it “merely enables a federal court to adjudicate
claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”86 The
class action rule “leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and
the rules of decision unchanged.”87 Although class certification transforms litigation more fundamentally than any other joinder mechanism,88 the transformation remains procedural (converting standard
litigation to representative litigation) rather than substantive (altering
rights and duties under applicable substantive law).89
If a class action has been certified solely for settlement and not
for litigation, however, then it is much harder to explain it as a mere
change in process. Unlike a litigation class, the settlement class action
does not establish a process in which the class members’ legal rights
remain intact. Rather, in a settlement class action, the very act of
class certification alters the parties’ substantive rights and duties by
replacing those rights and duties with the terms of the negotiated resolution.90 This differs from a class settlement reached after plenary
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
Id. at 408 (plurality opinion).
87 Id.
88 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions), with FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (counterclaims and
crossclaims), FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (third-party claims), FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (permissive joinder of
claims), FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (compulsory joinder of parties), FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties), FED. R. CIV. P. 22 (interpleader), and FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (intervention).
89 Shady Grove equates the class action rule with rules of joinder and consolidation, which
“neither change plaintiffs’ separate entitlements to relief nor abridge defendants’ rights; they
alter only how the claims are processed.” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408. Although Justice
Scalia’s opinion ignores the fundamental difference between joinder and representative litigation, and thus underestimates the transformative power of class certification, the opinion’s basic
defense of class actions under the REA is sound.
90 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848–49 (1999) (requiring “heightened attention” to certification of settlement-only class action because certification “effectively concludes the proceeding” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997))).
85
86
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class certification. In a litigation class action, the act of class certification does not alter the substantive rights of the parties, for the reasons
stated in Shady Grove.91 If the parties then reach a settlement, it represents a compromise of judicable class claims; as an REA matter, this
resembles the settlement of any other claim whose procedural posture
depends on application of the rules of civil procedure.92 Thus, plenary
certification of a class does not alter substantive rights and does not
violate the REA, even if the class claims are then resolved through
negotiation. But certification of a class solely to accomplish a negotiated resolution (i.e., a settlement class action) presents REA
problems because the moment of class certification itself alters the
substantive rights of the class members.
As a textual matter, Rule 23(e) states that “[t]he claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court’s approval.”93 The words “of a certified class” were added in 2003 to clarify that putative class representatives may settle their individual claims without the judge’s assent.94
But that language could be read as not merely limiting the circumstances when judicial approval is required, but also defining the circumstances under which classwide settlement is permitted in the first
place. Thus, one could interpret the rule to say that a court may approve a class settlement only if the settlement resolves the claims of a
certified class. The question is whether settlement-only class certification can suffice to meet this requirement, or whether class settlement
requires prior plenary class certification. As a matter of litigation policy, as a matter of adequate representation, and as a matter of construing the rule within the strictures of the REA, the latter interpretation
should be preferred.

See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407–08 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 408.
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (emphasis added).
94 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendments (“Rule
23(e)(1)(A) resolves the ambiguity in former Rule 23(e)’s reference to dismissal or compromise
of ‘a class action.’ That language could be—and at times was—read to require court approval of
settlements with putative class representatives that resolved only individual claims. The new
rule requires approval only if the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class are resolved by a
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.” (citation omitted)).
91
92
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WRONG DIRECTION

From Amchem to AIG and DeBeers

After the Supreme Court decided Amchem and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.95 in the late 1990s, rejecting two asbestos settlement
class actions, one might have thought that settlement class actions
were on their way out. Ortiz largely closed the door to limited fund
settlement class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).96 As far as Rule
23(b)(3) settlement class actions were concerned, the Supreme Court
in Amchem left the door open but expressed reservations. While declining to rule out the possibility of using the class action device to
settle disputes that could not be litigated on a class action basis, the
Court emphasized the dangers of settlement class actions and the
need for careful scrutiny.97
Amchem involved a massive deal to resolve asbestos claims for a
consortium of defendants.98 The district court approved the deal after
a thorough inquiry into the fairness of the settlement.99 On appeal,
the Third Circuit reversed. In an opinion by Judge Edward Becker,
the court held that unless a class action could be certified for trial, it
could not be certified for settlement.100 According to the Third Circuit, the district court had improperly substituted the settlement fairness inquiry of Rule 23(e) for the class certification inquiry of Rule
23(a) and (b).101 The Third Circuit relied in part on its decision one
year earlier in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Products Liability Litigation,102 where it considered the then-emerging
phenomenon of settlement class actions and announced its rule that a
settlement class must satisfy each of the requirements of class certifiOrtiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
While the Supreme Court in Ortiz did not rule out the possibility of limited fund class
actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), its rigid requirements—in particular the requirement that the
defendant put virtually all of its assets into the settlement—make such class actions unappetizing
to defendants as a voluntary means of resolving disputes. See id. at 859–61.
97 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–21 (1997).
98 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
99 See id. at 258 (noting appointment of special master to investigate aspects of fairness of
proposed settlement); see also JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT
CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 50 (1998) (describing fairness hearing that lasted eighteen
days over the course of five weeks, with testimony from medical, financial, and legal ethics
experts).
100 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617–18 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
101 Id. at 626.
102 In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995).
95
96
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cation; a determination of a fair settlement was no surrogate for the
class certification requirements.103 Applying this reasoning to the
Amchem settlement, the court found that the class had to be rejected
because it failed the Rule 23(a) requirements of typicality and adequacy of representation, as well as the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of
predominance and superiority.104
The Supreme Court, affirming, largely agreed with the Third Circuit’s reasoning. The Court added a distinction, however, while simultaneously downplaying that distinction’s significance: “We agree with
petitioners to this limited extent: Settlement is relevant to a class certification. The Third Circuit’s opinion bears modification in that respect.”105 The Supreme Court made clear that the one way in which
settlement bore on the certification of a settlement class action was
the question of trial manageability:
Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case,
if tried, would present intractable management problems, see
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that
there be no trial. But other specifications of the Rule—those
designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or
overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context.106
The Supreme Court took pains to emphasize that the requirements of class certification apply to settlement class actions, and that
those requirements cannot be ignored in the name of achieving an
attractive global resolution. The class certification requirements, the
Specifically, the Third Circuit explained:
After reflection upon these concerns, we conclude that Rule 23 permits courts to
achieve the significant benefits created by settlement classes so long as these courts
abide by all of the fundaments of the Rule. Settlement classes must satisfy the Rule
23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, as well as the relevant 23(b) requirements, usually (as in this case) the
(b)(3) superiority and predominance standards. . . . Additionally, we hold that a
finding that the settlement was fair and reasonable does not serve as a surrogate for
the class findings, and also that there is no lower standard for the certification of
settlement classes than there is for litigation classes. But so long as the four requirements of 23(a) and the appropriate requirement(s) of 23(b) are met, a court
may legitimately certify the class under the Rule.
Id. at 778.
104 Georgine, 83 F.3d at 618.
105 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997).
106 Id. at 620. Rule 23(b)(3)(D) names “the likely difficulties in managing a class action” as
one of the factors to be considered when certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)(D).
103

976

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:951

Court stated, “focus court attention on whether a proposed class has
sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when
settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.”107 The Rule 23(a) and (b)
class certification safeguards “are not impractical impediments—
checks shorn of utility—in the settlement-class context.”108 Rather,
those safeguards protect against appraisals based on a judge’s “gestalt
judgment or overarching impression of the settlement’s fairness.”109
While the Court’s decision in Amchem is not a model of clarity,
its basic thrust is an insistence that any settlement class action meet
the requirements of class certification as a way to ensure sufficient
cohesion to warrant classwide resolution. The Rule 23(e) determination of the fairness of the settlement functions as an independent condition for settlement approval, not as a substitute for the Rule 23(a)
and (b) findings that support class certification.
Cautious as the Supreme Court may have intended to be in
Amchem, it effectively sanctioned the use of settlement-only class certification as a means of resolving mass disputes. Notwithstanding the
Court’s emphasis on the importance of the class certification safeguards, the Second and Third Circuits have relied on Amchem’s dicta
to support the use of settlement-only class certification to resolve disputes that could not be adjudicated through class action litigation. In
other words, rather than insist upon plenary class certification before
settlement (as this Article argues would be the better approach), these
courts have moved in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court had
it wrong in Amchem; it should have rejected settlement-only class certification. Recent cases have departed from Amchem, but unfortunately they have done so by adopting a more permissive stance toward
settlement class actions.
AIG involved securities fraud claims by investors against American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) and other defendants, including the General Reinsurance Corporation (“Gen Re”), alleging that
AIG and Gen Re entered into a sham reinsurance transaction that
artificially inflated AIG’s share price.110 The plaintiffs moved for class
certification, invoking the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to establish
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
Id.
109 Id.; see also Klonoff, supra note 20, at 801–02 (emphasizing Amchem’s insistence that
class certification requirements be met, and its rejection of the argument that a settlement class
can be approved solely on grounds that the settlement is fair); id. at 805 (referring to “Amchem’s
conflation of class settlement with class litigation”).
110 In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. (AIG), 689 F.3d 229, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2012).
107
108
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reliance. The district court denied class certification for claims against
the Gen Re defendants, finding that the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not apply, and therefore that individual reliance issues
predominated over common issues.111 By then, however, Gen Re and
the lead plaintiffs had reached agreement on a classwide settlement,
and they pursued approval of this settlement notwithstanding the district court’s ruling on class certification.
Four months after the court’s denial of class certification for litigation, the lead plaintiffs and Gen Re jointly moved for preliminary
approval of their settlement class action.112 The district court refused
to certify the settlement class, holding that the class failed to meet the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because of the inapplicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.113 The court then dismissed the claims against Gen Re.114 On appeal, both the lead
plaintiffs and Gen Re argued that the district court should have certified the settlement class action. The Second Circuit largely agreed
and vacated the district court’s order.115
According to the Second Circuit, certification of a settlement
class may be permissible even in the absence of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. The court emphasized the difference between class
certification for trial and for settlement, explaining that “[i]n the context of a settlement class, concerns about whether individual issues
would create ‘intractable management problems’ at trial drop out of
the predominance analysis because ‘the proposal is that there be no
111 In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Because
Lead Plaintiffs have not established or even pled that the Gen Re Defendants made any public
misstatement or omission with regard to AIG, the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not
apply to claims against these Defendants, and individual issues of reliance predominate over
common issues for the claims against the Gen Re Defendants regarding AIG stock. Accordingly, the Court does not certify the class of claims against the Gen Re Defendants.”), vacated
and remanded, 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012). On the centrality of the fraud-on-the-market presumption to class certification in securities fraud actions, see generally Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
112 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. at 175; see also AIG, 689 F.3d at
236–37 (“[T]hey jointly moved for preliminary approval of the settlement, arguing that even if
certification of a litigation class was inappropriate, the court could—and should—nonetheless
certify a settlement class. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem, the Settling
Parties argued that the individual reliance issues that led the court to deny class certification
would not pose a problem of trial manageability because the very existence of the settlement
eliminated the need for a trial.” (citation omitted)).
113 AIG, 689 F.3d at 237 (citing Dismissal Order at 3–4, In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. 1:04-cv-08141-DAB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010), ECF No. 557).
114

Id.

115

Id. at 244.
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trial.’ ”116 The Second Circuit declined to reach the merits of whether
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine applied to the claims against Gen
Re. As to certification of the settlement class action, however, the
Second Circuit held explicitly that certification of a settlement class is
permissible even if the absence of the fraud-on-the-market presumption would otherwise render a litigation class uncertifiable:
Even assuming that the district court correctly applied
Stoneridge [Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.117]—an issue we do not reach—the court erred in holding that a Section 10(b) settlement class must satisfy the
fraud-on-the-market presumption in order to demonstrate
predominance. In the context of a litigation class, the fraudon-the-market presumption spares the plaintiff class from
the extremely laborious—and often impossible—task of
proving at trial that each individual plaintiff was aware of
and specifically relied upon the defendant’s false statement.
Therefore, a litigation class’s failure to qualify for [the]
Basic [Inc. v. Levinson118] presumption typically renders trial
unmanageable, precluding a finding that common issues
predominate. By contrast, with a settlement class, the manageability concerns posed by numerous individual questions
of reliance disappear.119
The court concluded that a settlement class may be certified without the fraud-on-the-market theory:
[A] Section 10(b) settlement class’s failure to satisfy the
fraud-on-the-market presumption does not necessarily preclude a finding of predominance. Where a Section 10(b) settlement class would otherwise satisfy the predominance
requirement, the fact that the plaintiff class is unable to invoke the presumption, without more, is no obstacle to
certification.120
In DeBeers, the DeBeers diamond antitrust case, the Third Circuit en banc adopted a similar approach, upholding a settlement class
Id. at 240 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)).
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156–58 (2008)
(addressing the availability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to establish reliance in securities
fraud cases).
118 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
119 AIG, 689 F.3d at 241 (footnote and citations omitted) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 242
(“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class
effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”)).
120 Id. at 242–43.
116
117
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action even when the matter would have been unsuitable for classwide
adjudication on the merits.121 Objectors argued that variations in state
law rendered the dispute inappropriate for nationwide class treatment. Most of the class members were indirect purchasers122 whose
federal antitrust claims for money damages were barred under Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois.123 Plaintiffs asserted claims under state law, but
the viability of these claims depended upon whether each state permitted antitrust claims by indirect purchasers.124 A number of states
have enacted “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes to extend antitrust
standing to indirect purchasers, while other states follow the federal
approach and deny standing to indirect purchasers.125 Variations in
law often doom motions for nationwide class certification,126 because
significant legal divergences in state law claims can undermine typicality,127 adequacy,128 predominance,129 and superiority.130
121 See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., No. 04-2819 (SRC), 2008 WL 8747721, at *1–2 (D.N.J.
May 22, 2008) (consolidating the following actions already certified for litigation: Order Certifying Plaintiff Class, Hopkins v. De Beers Centenary AG, No. CGC-04-432954 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Apr. 18, 2005) (certified by the San Francisco Superior Court in California); Certification Order,
Null v. D.B. Invs., Inc., No. 05-L-209 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2005) (certified by the Madison County
Circuit Court in Illinois); Leider v. Ralfe, No. 01 Civ. 3137(HB), 2003 WL 22339305 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 10, 2003) (certified as an injunctive class action by the Southern District of New York);
Anco Indus. Diamond Corp. v. DB Invs., Inc., No. 01-4463 (SRC) (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2003) (certified by the District of New Jersey)). It would be unfair, therefore, to characterize the matter as
one in which a settlement class action occurred despite the impossibility of litigation class certification. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s en banc decision treated the case as one in which settlement class certification should be upheld even if state law variations would render plenary class
certification improper. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 303 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (“Because we are presented with a settlement class certification, we are not as concerned with formulating some prediction as to how [variances in state law] would play out at
trial, for the proposal is that there be no trial.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
122 DeBeers, 667 F.3d at 289 & n.8 (defining the indirect purchaser class).
123 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that only direct purchasers have
standing to sue for money damages under the Sherman Act).
124 See DeBeers, 667 F.3d at 291.
125 See id. at 293–94.
126 See supra note 16.
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring that “the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”).
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that “the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”). Robert Klonoff
notes that the Third Circuit reached its conclusion about settlement class certifiability in the face
of state law variations “notwithstanding numerous cases holding, in the trial context, that the
existence of multiple state laws defeats predominance as well as manageability.” Klonoff, supra
note 20, at 804.
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that “a class action is superior to other available
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In DeBeers, however, the Third Circuit rejected the argument
that state law variations rendered the case unsuitable for class treatment. Variations in state law, the court declared, “ ‘are irrelevant to
certification of a settlement class’ since a settlement would eliminate
the principal burden of establishing the elements of liability under disparate laws.”131 The court treated the problem of legal variations as
merely a matter of trial manageability, explaining: “The proposed settlement here obviates the difficulties inherent in proving the elements
of varied claims at trial or in instructing a jury on varied state laws,
and ‘the difference is key.’ ”132 In so doing, the court brushed aside
the more important question of predominance:
The correct outcome is even clearer for certification of a settlement class because the concern for manageability that is a
central tenet in the certification of a litigation class is removed from the equation. Indeed, the class settlement posture of this case largely marginalizes the objectors’ concern
that state law variations undermine a finding of
predominance.133
Throughout the opinion, the court stressed that its decision involved a settlement rather than a process for adjudicating the merits
of the antitrust claims. For example, regarding whether class members could show the requisite threat of antitrust injury, the court could
not be bothered: “Due to the settlement posture of this case, which
controls, we need not concern ourselves with this issue.”134 Judge
Scirica, concurring, agreed that settlement class actions may succeed
even in disputes that could not be certified for trial: “[S]ome inquiries
essential to litigation class certification are no longer problematic in
the settlement context. A key question in a litigation class action is
manageability . . . . But the settlement class presents no management
problems because the case will not be tried.”135
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)(D) (listing, as a factor pertinent to certification, “the likely difficulties in managing a
class action”).
131 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 303 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 529 (3d Cir. 2004)).
132 Id. at 304 (quoting Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 529).
133 Id. at 302–03.
134 Id. at 318.
135 Id. at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring). Judge Scirica also pointed out the importance of
close attention to the adequacy of representation in settlement class actions: “Conversely, other
inquiries assume heightened importance and heightened scrutiny because of the danger of conflicts of interest, collusion, and unfair allocation.” Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)).
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AIG and DeBeers show what happens when courts hone in on
Amchem’s dicta on manageability, ignoring the broader concerns
about cohesion, leverage, and fairness that animated the Court’s decision. Armed with the Supreme Court’s modest permission to treat
settlement classes slightly differently than litigation classes,136 these
courts approved settlement class actions notwithstanding core issues
of class cohesiveness that go to the heart of class certification.137 In
permitting settlement class actions without prior plenary class certification, Amchem took the wrong road to begin with. By extending
Amchem to situations in which certification would ordinarily be compromised—by the inapplicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
and significant variations in state consumer laws, respectively—AIG
and DeBeers have gone further astray.
B.

Reform Proposals

Recent reform proposals would amend the class action rule to
permit settlement class certification regardless of whether the class
could be certified for trial. For the reasons discussed in Parts I and II,
such a move would be ill advised.
1.

Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation

In 2010, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) adopted a set of
principles concerning aggregate litigation, which included a number of
proposals to alter existing law. Among the reform proposals is one
that would allow settlement class actions to proceed on a lesser showing than required under Amchem’s interpretation of Rule 23. Specifically, § 3.06 of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
provides, in relevant part:
(a) In any case in which the parties simultaneously seek
certification and approval of the settlement, the case need
not satisfy all of the requirements for certification of a class
for purposes of litigation, but instead need satisfy only the
requirements of subsections (b) and (c)138 of this Section.
See supra text accompanying notes 105–09.
Alexandra Lahav notes that the approval of these settlement class actions, at a time of
tighter certification standards for litigation class actions, “will alter the power dynamics in favor
of defendants and undo the symmetry between parties that the class action procedure was intended to achieve.” Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1494, 1499 (2013).
138 Section 3.06(c), which concerns the special requirements for mandatory class actions, is
not addressed here. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.06(c).
136
137
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(b) . . . a court may approve a settlement class if it finds
that the settlement satisfies the criteria of § 3.05 [concerning
judicial review of settlement fairness], and it further finds
that (1) significant common issues exist, (2) the class is sufficiently numerous to warrant classwide treatment, and (3) the
class definition is sufficient to ascertain who is and who is not
included in the class. The court need not conclude that common issues predominate over individual issues.139
Under this proposal, settlement class actions would require judicial review as under current Rule 23(e),140 and a showing of numerosity and commonality as under current Rule 23(a).141 Likewise, the
requirement of adequate representation would remain.142 But the
proposal would do away with the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that
common issues predominate over individual issues, and it would eliminate or at least alter the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that a court find
“that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”143 Thus, if adopted, the
ALI proposal would not only confirm that a settlement class action
need not be certifiable for litigation, but it also would explicitly abolish the predominance requirement for settlement class actions.
The Reporters for the ALI project acknowledge that settlement
class actions raise concerns about class counsel’s lack of leverage. In
the Reporters’ Notes, they offer three arguments in response to the
leverage problem. First, they point out that the volume of individual
claims can create leverage even without class certification: “To begin
with, oftentimes in mass-harm cases, the global resolution is driven by
the press of individual cases. It may well be that class counsel is able
to use the threat of litigation outside the class context to drive a
favorable overall settlement.”144 Second, they explain that “it is often
not clear during precertification settlement negotiations whether the
court would certify the case for litigation purposes. It is often the posId. § 3.06.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
141 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that the class be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring that “there are questions of law
or fact common to the class”).
142 See AM. LAW. INST., supra note 17, § 3.05(a)(1) (requiring, as part of judicial review of
the fairness of a class settlement, a finding that “the class representatives and class counsel have
been and currently are adequately representing the class”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring
adequate representation as a prerequisite for class certification).
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
144 AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.06 reporters’ notes, cmt. a.
139
140
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sibility—but not certainty—of class certification that drives the parties
to settle.”145 Third, they make the broader point that the requirement
of adequate representation resolves the leverage problem presented
by settlement class actions. They note that their proposal “requires
the court, in any settlement class, to find that the class has been adequately represented.”146 Each of these arguments deserves a
response.
First, as to the significance of individual cases, it is certainly the
case that a high volume of individual claims creates leverage. I have
written at length elsewhere on the importance of collective representation and lawyer coordination for leveling the field in multi-claimant
litigation.147 But just because the collective representation of numerous individual claimants provides a sound basis on which to negotiate
a proposed resolution of those individual claims does not mean that it
provides a sound basis on which to negotiate a resolution on behalf of
a class whom the lawyer does not yet represent. The question is not
whether settlement class actions are sometimes driven by the threat of
nonclass litigation. Rather, the question is whether the class resolution offers as accurate a valuation of the claims as would have been
achieved had the negotiating lawyer been empowered to pursue the
class claims to trial; and if it does not offer as accurate a valuation,
then the question is why such an asymmetrically negotiated resolution
is entitled to enforcement by judicial edict.
Second, the ALI Reporters assert that the “possibility—but not
certainty—of class certification” often “drives the parties to settle.”148
In my view, the uncertainty of class certification does not support the
legitimacy of settlement class actions, but rather cuts against it. True,
the risk of class certification denial may drive would-be class counsel
to agree to a settlement. But that provides no comfort to those who
are concerned about settlement class counsel’s disadvantaged bargaining position, providing them valid reason to worry that the lawyer
lacks leverage to exact fair value for their claims. Moreover, it matId.
Id.
147 See Sergio J. Campos & Howard M. Erichson, Debate, The Future of Mass Torts, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 231, 237–40 (2011), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/159-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-231.pdf (Howard M. Erichson Rebuttal); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 531–43; Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation:
Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50
DUKE L.J. 381, 386–401 (2000).
148 AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.06 reporters’ notes, cmt. a.
145
146
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ters whether a dispute is suitable for classwide resolution. Do the
claims cohere sufficiently to warrant classwide resolution? Is a class
action superior to individual actions for resolving the particular dispute in light of the individual stakes and the significance of individual
issues? On questions like these, the improbability of class certification
cuts against permitting a settlement class action, not in favor as the
ALI Reporters suggest.
Third, as to the ALI Reporters’ argument that leverage concerns
should be subsumed into the general question of whether there is adequate representation, one must ask what it means to find that a class
has been adequately represented. The ALI proposal, like current
class action law, requires a judicial finding of adequate representation.149 But it is not clear how a self-appointed negotiator (or, at least,
a negotiator not yet authorized to be the agent for the class150), who
suffers from a structural deficit of leverage by virtue of the very definition of a settlement class action, can ever be found an adequate representative. The question is not whether the lawyer acted in good
faith, or whether the lawyer worked competently and diligently.
Rather, the question is whether would-be class counsel, lacking power
to litigate the class claims, is ever sufficiently well positioned to negotiate a resolution that a court should enforce. The Reporters seem
highly confident that “[a] settlement arrived at through a lack of bargaining power would lack indicia of adequacy and would almost certainly be so deficient that it could not satisfy the fairness criteria of
§ 3.05,”151 but it is not so clear that inadequately leveraged negotiations would consistently lead to settlement rejections by courts. Evaluating the fairness of class settlements presents a challenge for judges,
who rely heavily on the presumption that arm’s length negotiations
lead to appropriate pricing of claims.152 The ALI Reporters’ explanation of how judicial review answers the structural problem of settlement class actions comes precariously close to conflating leverage and
collusion.153
149 Compare id. § 3.06(b) (incorporating § 3.05(a)(1), which requires a court to address
whether class adequately represented before approving settlement), with FED. R. CIV. P.
23(a)(4) (requiring adequate representation as a prerequisite for class certification).
150 On the possibility of court-appointed interim counsel under Rule 23(g)(3), see supra
notes 38–43 and accompanying text. Interim appointment without class certification ameliorates
certain leverage and agency concerns but leaves others unresolved.
151 AM. LAW INST., supra note 17, § 3.06 reporters’ notes, cmt. a; see also id. § 3.05 (outlining criteria for courts to consider in determining fairness of class settlements).
152 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2005).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 44–62.
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Federal Rule 23

Settlement class actions have also returned to the agenda of the
Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Advisory Committee”).
The Advisory Committee recently asked a subcommittee to consider
potential amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the
subcommittee is considering a suggestion to facilitate settlement class
actions.154 This new proposal harkens back to a rule amendment that
was nearly adopted in the 1990s.
In 1996, the Advisory Committee circulated a proposed amendment that would have created a Rule 23(b)(4) category specifically for
settlement class actions.155 It would have allowed a class action to be
maintained where “the parties to a settlement request certification
under . . .[Rule 23](b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the
requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for purposes of
trial.”156 The Advisory Committee’s report spelled out its intent to
permit negotiated resolution on a classwide basis even if the matter
would not be certifiable as a litigation class action:
New . . . [Rule 23](b)(4) authorizes certification of a
(b)(3) class for purposes of settlement. It requires that all of
the subdivision (a) prerequisites for class certification be
met, and that the predominance and superiority requirements of (b)(3) also be met. But it authorizes evaluation of
these prerequisites and requirements from the perspective of
settlement. A settlement class may be certified even though
the same class would not be certified for purposes of litigation. . . . Certification is permitted only on motion by parties
to a settlement agreement already reached.157
The accompanying Advisory Committee’s note similarly emphasized that the proposed Rule 23(b)(4) would permit certification “for
settlement purposes, even though the same class might not be certified
for trial.”158 The amendment was designed, the proposed note explained, to resolve the “newly apparent disagreement” between the
courts that permitted settlement-only certification159 and those
154 Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Rule 23 Subcomm., Reporter’s Memorandum Regarding Rule 23 app.A.1 at 11 (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-10.pdf.
155 See Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559 (1996).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 537.
158 Id. at 563.
159 Id. (citing Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1982), and In re Beef
Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 170–71, 173–78 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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(namely, the Third Circuit) that required litigation class certifiability
for any settlement class.160
Had the proposed Rule 23(b)(4) been adopted, it would have
provided a textual basis for the Second Circuit’s 2012 ruling in AIG
that a settlement class could be approved even if the absence of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption would have rendered the matter
unsuitable for a litigation class.161 Even more, it would have shored
up the Third Circuit’s 2011 ruling in DeBeers that a settlement class
could be approved even if variations in state law would have interfered with litigation class certification.162 The Advisory Committee’s
note to the proposed amendment made it clear that, though a settlement class action would still have to satisfy each requirement of Rule
23(a), as well as the predominance and superiority requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3), those requirements could play out very differently in
the settlement context, explaining:
Subdivision (b)(4) serves only to make it clear that implementation of the factors that control certification of a (b)(3)
class is affected by the many differences between settlement
and litigation of class claims or defenses. Choice-of-law difficulties, for example, may force certification of many subclasses, or even defeat any class certification, if claims are to
be litigated. Settlement can be reached, however, on terms
that surmount such difficulties. Many other elements are affected as well. . . . And, perhaps most important, settlement
may prove far superior to litigation in devising comprehensive solutions to large-scale problems that defy ready disposition by traditional adversary litigation.163
The Rule 23(b)(4) proposal emerged from the Advisory Committee while the Amchem litigation was making its way through the
courts but before the Supreme Court ruled in that case. After the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Amchem, the Committee chose
not to proceed with the proposal.164
160 Id. (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), and In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick–Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995)).
161 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. (AIG), 689 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2012).
162 See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc. (DeBeers), 667 F.3d 273, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
163 Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, supra note 155, at 563–64.
164 See Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes (Oct. 6–7, 1997), available at
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Minutes/cv10-97.htm (“Because the Committee cannot be confident of what the Court intended, cannot be confident whether the published
proposal means something else, and cannot be confident of the ways in which an adopted
amendment might be interpreted against the background of the Court’s opinion, further work is
necessary if Rule 23 is to be amended to address settlement classes.”).
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But some issues just won’t go away. The Advisory Committee
created a new Rule 23 subcommittee to study current trends in class
action practice and to consider possible amendments,165 and one of the
topics on the subcommittee’s agenda is settlement class actions. According to the notes of the subcommittee, “there has been a suggestion that [the subcommittee] rethink the conclusion in Amchem that
Rule 23(e)’s criteria are no substitute for anything in Rule 23(a) or
(b).”166 In other words, the suggestion is to permit settlement class
actions based on judicial evaluation of the fairness of the resolution
even without a judicial determination separately addressing the suitability of classwide treatment. Or, as the Advisory Committee minutes
put the question: “Should there be criteria for certifying a settlement
class different from the criteria for certifying a litigation class?”167 It
remains to be seen whether this suggestion will evolve into a proposed
rule amendment, and if so, whether it will gain any traction. The arguments advanced in this Article counsel against moving in the direction
of this latest Rule 23 proposal on settlement class actions. If we are to
rethink Amchem, we should rethink it in precisely the opposite
direction.168
CONCLUSION
The standard critique of Amchem is that the Supreme Court was
too cautious with regard to settlement class actions, placing unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of parties to resolve their disputes by
165 Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of the Judicial Conference to the
Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United States
26 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/
ST09-2012.pdf.
166 Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, supra note 154, at 11.
167 Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes 32 (Mar. 22–23, 2012), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV03-2012-min.pdf.
168 Outside of the United States, some legal systems permit class settlement only if a class
has been certified for purposes of litigation. The Chilean class action procedure, for example,
permits class settlements with judicial approval but does not allow certification for the purpose
of accomplishing a settlement. See Agustı́n Barroilhet, Class Actions in Chile, 18 LAW & BUS.
REV. AMERICAS 275, 285, 290 (2012). In the Netherlands, by contrast, money damages class
actions are permitted only as a settlement vehicle. Under the 2005 Dutch Act on the Collective
Settlement of Mass Claims, or Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade, associational claimant
representatives and putative defendants may jointly petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals
to make a negotiated settlement binding on all persons to whom damage was caused. See
Deborah R. Hensler, Keynote, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 310–13 (2011); Franziska Weber & Willem H. van Boom, Dutch Treat: The Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act (WCAM
2005), 1 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA/EUROPA 69, 69–70 (2011).
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negotiation. Samuel Issacharoff has suggested that the Amchem decision was “proceduralist” in the worst sense of the word.169 Elizabeth
Cabraser has argued that the asbestos class members in Amchem
would have been better off with compensation under the settlement
rather than preserving their “pristine due process rights.”170 Robert
Klonoff has challenged the ruling on social welfare grounds:
“Amchem’s conflation of class settlement with class litigation undermines the benefits of avoiding litigation and may result in plaintiffs
being unable to pursue socially beneficial settlements.”171 This Article
contends that, as a statement of the law governing settlement class
actions, Amchem deserves criticism for exactly the opposite reason—
the Supreme Court was not cautious enough. The Court’s “conflation
of class settlement with class litigation,” to use Klonoff’s phrase, was
unfortunately incomplete. By permitting settlement class actions
without plenary class certification, the Court invited defendants to use
the settlement class tool to resolve widespread liability through negotiation with deleveraged would-be class counsel.
It is time to abandon the settlement class action. Notwithstanding the device’s attractiveness to defendants, to plaintiffs’ counsel, and
to judges as a means of achieving comprehensive resolutions, it does
not withstand scrutiny as a legitimate exercise of judicial authority.
There is no sound basis on which a settlement class action, in the absence of litigation class certification, should bind class members. We
need to be clear on what a settlement class action is, or more precisely, what it is not. It is not a contract, at least not in the sense of an
agreement to which the class members are parties. It is not an adjudication on the merits. Rather, it is an act of judicial power premised on
a negotiated resolution. But the underlying negotiation has the odd
characteristic that the negotiator for the claimants is a prospective
agent who has neither been authorized to act on behalf of the claimants nor been granted the power to take their claims to trial. This
feature creates an asymmetrical dynamic that negates any argument
169 See Samuel Issacharoff, Commentary, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos
Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1926 (2002). Issacharoff describes the
class action debates of the 1990s in terms of a showdown between “distributionalists” and
“proceduralists.” In Amchem and Ortiz, “to put it mildly, the proceduralists won hands down.”
Id. at 1927. He goes on to ask rhetorically: “But what did the proceduralists really win?” Id.
170 See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1476 (2005) (“[T]he multibillion-dollar settlement, rejected by the Supreme Court, was lost forever, and thousands of claimants who would gladly have traded their pristine due process rights
for substantial monetary compensation have been consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos bankruptcies.”).
171 Klonoff, supra note 20, at 805.
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that the act of judicial power is justified by a presumption of fair valuation of claims. The problem is not one of collusion or bad faith, but
rather a structural problem built into the very definition of a settlement class action.
Lest my argument be construed as a denunciation of classwide
resolutions of mass disputes, let me be clear: this Article does not contend that there is anything problematic about resolving disputes on a
classwide basis.172 Rather, it argues that if a dispute is to be resolved
on a classwide basis, then class counsel must be empowered to pursue
classwide adjudication rather than only settlement. If a court considers a matter suitable for classwide resolution—as should be the case in
many disputes involving similarly situated claimants who cannot pursue their claims effectively on a nonclass basis—then the court should
certify the class action. Armed with plenary class certification, class
counsel could negotiate without the inherent disadvantage that accompanies the negotiation of a settlement class action under current
law.173 Without plenary class certification, a negotiated resolution
cannot legitimately bind the class.

172 Samuel Issacharoff correctly asserts that “the Supreme Court’s rendition of the issues in
Amchem and Ortiz has an air of fantasy about it” because “the Court did not meaningfully
engage the fact that mass torts are not handled on a one-client/one-lawyer basis and do not
conform to any common-law notion of individual representation.” Issacharoff, supra note 169,
at 1927. The issue in mass disputes, to borrow from Issacharoff, “is not whether to proceed in the
aggregate, but how to properly structure the inevitable aggregation of these cases.” See id. This
Article suggests not that mass claims should be handled individually rather than collectively, but
rather that the settlement class action is not the proper structure for handling the inevitable
aggregation of these cases.
173 For examples of class action settlements reached after litigation class certification, see
Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2005); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140,
1144–45 (8th Cir. 1999).

